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Abstract
Classical cooperative game theory is no longer a suitable tool for those situations where
the values of coalitions are not known with certainty. Recent works address situations
where the values of coalitions are modelled by random variables. In this work we still
consider the values of coalitions as uncertain, but model them as unknown but bounded
disturbances. We do not focus on solving a specific game, but rather consider a family of
games described by a polyhedron: each point in the polyhedron is a vector of coalitions’
values and corresponds to a specific game. We consider a dynamic context where while
we know with certainty the average value of each coalition on the long run, at each time
such a value is unknown and fluctuates within the bounded polyhedron. Then, it makes
sense to define “robust” allocation rules, i.e., allocation rules that bound, within a pre-
defined threshold, a so-called complaint vector while guaranteeing a certain average (over
time) allocation vector. We also present as motivating example a joint replenishment
application.
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1 Introduction.
Classical cooperative game theory is no longer a suitable tool for those situations where
the values of coalitions are not known with certainty. Recent works address situations where
the values of coalitions are modelled by random variables (see, e.g., [8, 9, 11, 12]. In this work
we also consider the values of coalitions as uncertain, but model them as unknown but bounded
disturbances as in [1]. We do not focus on solving a specific game, but rather consider a family
of games described by a polyhedron: each point in the polyhedron is a vector of coalitions’
values and corresponds to a specific game. In doing this, we revisit the notion of the core
with reference to a family of balanced games described in polyhedral form.
∗Dipartimento di Ingegneria Informatica, Universita` di Palermo, V.le delle Scienze, 90128 Palermo, Italy.
Email: dario.bauso@unipa.it
†Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Nether-
lands. Email: j.b.timmer@utwente.nl
1
The main contribution of this paper is the uncertain and dynamic framework within
which we cast the cooperative game. Dynamic cooperative games dealt with in [2, 4] model
the evolution of the coalitions’ values given the current value and the allocated revenues.
Differently, in this work the average value of each coalition over time, henceforth called
average coalitions’ value, is known with certainty but the instantaneous value is unknown
and fluctuates within a bounded polyhedron. Actually, knowing the average coalitions’ value
is more realistic than knowing the fluctuations of the instantaneous values as the latter are
much more subject to randomness. At each time, to each coalition a certain revenue is
allocated which, in general, will not meet the actual instantaneous value of that coalition. A
“complaint” vector stores the disagreement between the instantaneous value of each coalition
and the sum of the allocated revenues to all its players. The complaint is then the state
variable describing the past history of the dynamic system considered. Under the assumption
that the only information available at each time is the complaint of the coalitions, it makes
sense to define “robust” allocation rules, i.e., allocation rules that i) keep the complaint
vector bounded within a pre-defined threshold ε at each time (we will refer to such rules as
ε-stabilizing), while ii) guaranteeing a certain average allocation vector over time. Obviously,
the average allocation vector must meet the average coalitions’ values (we will also say that
it must satisfy the average constraints). Summarizing, the problem of interest consists in
finding ε-stabilizing allocation rules meeting the average constraints.
A further contribution of this work is a constructive method to solve the aforementioned
problem. The dynamic allocation rule that we present allocates the revenues according to the
values assumed by an opportunely designed augmented state variable. Such a state variable
models the complaint level of each coalition combined with the deviation of the instantaneous
allocation from the pre-defined average allocation of each coalition. With the given aug-
mented state variable the problem reduces to simply finding an ε-stabilizing allocation rule
for the augmented dynamic system. Actually, as it will be clearer later on, ε-stabilizing the
augmented system implies both ε-stabilizing the complaint vector and meeting the average
constraints.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the joint replenishment appli-
cation which motivates our research. Furthermore, we introduce the polyhedral description
for a family of balanced games. In Section 3, we describe the system of interest and formulate
the problem. In Section 4, we present the constructive method to find the dynamic alloca-
tion rule, solution of Problem 1. In Section 5, we present a numerical example. Finally, in
Section 6 we deal with the Shapley value and the associated linear allocation rule.
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Figure 1: Example of a one warehouse W and three retailers R1, R2 and R3. R1 faces a
demand in the interval [0, 5], R2 in the interval [0, 10], and R3 in the interval [3, 8].
2 Joint replenishment: motivation and polyhedral descrip-
tion.
Consider a single-period one-warehouse multi-retailer inventory system (see, e.g., [3, 5, 6].
Fig. 1 displays a warehouse W serving three retailers R1, R2 and R3. Each retailer faces a
demand bounded by a minimum and a maximum value. For instance R1 faces a demand d1
in the interval [d−1 , d
+
1 ] = [0, 5], R2 faces a demand d2 in the interval [d
−
2 , d
+
2 ] = [0, 10], and
R3 faces a demand d3 in the interval [d
−
3 , d
+
3 ] = [3, 8].
The retailers do not hold any private inventory, therefore to fulfill the demand, they must
reorder from the central warehouse at a fixed transportation cost. Let this cost be K = 7 in
the current example. The value of di is known by retailer Ri who selects his best decision
regarding whether to reorder or not. In case of joint replenishment retailers are served by a
single truck and share the transportation cost as established by the warehouse holder. The
warehouse holder must in turn choose how to allocate costs among retailers based on the
only knowledge of their demand intervals [d−i , d
+
i ]. In other words, from the warehouse holder
standpoint, demand di is unknown but bounded. Also, the decision on cost allocation takes
place before demand is realized. Because, after demand is realized, the retailers will place
their orders or not and from this the warehouse may deduce information about the demand
di. We wish to find allocation rules that let all retailers benefit from joint replenishment at
least on the long run.
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We model the problem as a cooperative inventory game in coalitional form. In the example
we have a set of three players N = {1, 2, 3}, namely the three retailers. If player i plays alone,
the cost of reordering coincides with the full transportation cost (a single truck serves him
alone) whereas the cost of not reordering is the cost of unfulfilled demand, that is, lost demand.
Assume the latter cost is one unit per unit of unfulfilled demand.
To be more specific, for retailer R1 in the example, the cost of reordering is K = 7
whereas the cost of not reordering varies in the bounded range [0, 5]. For R1 the best decision
is “no reordering” independently of the realization of d1 and the associated cost c({1}) ∈[
min{d−1 ,K},min{d
+
1 ,K}
]
= [0, 5].
For R2 the best decision is “reordering” if d2 is between 7 and 10 and “no reordering” if
d2 is between 0 and 7. In the first case he reorders and pays K, whereas in the second case he
does not reorder and pays d2. Then c({2}) ∈
[
min{d−2 ,K},min{d
+
2 ,K}
]
= [0, 7]. Note that
for d2 = 7 the incurred cost is 7 independently of the decision.
If two players form a coalition they are forced to select a joint decision (“both reorder” or
“both do not reorder”). The cost of reordering for the coalition is still the total transportation
cost which, this time, must be shared between the two players. The cost of not reordering
is the sum of the unfulfilled demands of both players. For instance, the cost of coalition
S = {1, 2} is c({1, 2}) ∈
[
min{(d−1 + d
−
2 ),K},min{(d
+
1 + d
+
2 ),K}
]
= [0, 7].
In general, denote by R+ the set of nonnegative reals and let di ∈ R
+ be the unknown but
bounded demand faced by retailer i and varying between d−i and d
+
i , that is di ∈ [d
−
i , d
+
i ]. Let
N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players and apply the same reasoning as above to compute the
cost of all subcoalitions of N except for the empty set ∅. Henceforth, for the sake of notation,
the inclusion S ⊆ N means “all subcoalitions of N except the empty set ∅”. For any given
coalition S ⊆ N it holds
min(K,
∑
i∈S
d−i ) ≤ c(S) ≤ min(K,
∑
i∈S
d+i ). (1)
Hence, the joint replenishment model results in a family of cost-games < N, C > where C is
a polyhedron defined by
C =
{
c ∈ R2
n−1 : min(K,
∑
i∈S
d−i ) ≤ c(S) ≤ min(K,
∑
i∈S
d+i ), for all S ⊆ N
}
.
Observe that each point c ∈ C is a vector of coalitions’ costs and corresponds to a specific
cost-game.
Given the cost of a coalition S as in (1), we can compute the cost savings v(S) of this
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coalition.
v(S) =
∑
i∈S
c({i})− c(S) (2)
∈
∑
i∈S
[
min(K, d−
i
),min(K, d+
i
)
]
−
[
min(K,
∑
i∈S
d−
i
),min(K,
∑
i∈S
d+
i
)
]
(3)
=
[∑
i∈S
min(K, d−
i
)−min(K,
∑
i∈S
d−
i
),
∑
i∈S
min(K, d+
i
)−min(K,
∑
i∈S
d+
i
)
]
. (4)
For example, the cost savings of coalition S = {1, 2} in the example are v({1, 2}) = c({1}) +
c({2}) − c({1, 2}) ∈ [0, 5].
It turns out that the cost savings, or value, of each coalition is bounded by a minimum
and a maximum value, i.e., vmin(S) ≤ v(S) ≤ vmax(S) with fixed bounds vmin(S) and
vmax(S). Thus, the family of cost games implies a family of cost-saving games < N,V > with
polyhedron
V =
{
v ∈ R2
n−1 : vmin(S) ≤ v(S) ≤ vmax(S), for all c ∈ C and S ⊆ N
}
(5)
and each value v(S) is computed according to (2).
We are now in a position to show that the family of games (5) satisfies an interesting
property. Namely, each vector v ∈ V corresponds to a balanced game, or in other words, (5)
is a family of balanced games. For this, denote by 2N the family of subsets of N . We recall
the definition of a balanced map and a balanced game (see, e.g., [10, Def. 11.5]).
Definition 1 (Balanced map) A map λ : 2N \ {∅} → R+ is called a balanced map if∑
S⊆N
λ(S)eS = eN .
Here, eS ∈ Rn is the characteristic vector for coalition S with eSi = 1 if i ∈ S and e
S
i = 0
if i ∈ N \ S.
Definition 2 (Balanced game) An n-person game < N, v > game is called a balanced
game if for each balanced map λ : 2N \ {∅} → R+,∑
S⊆N
λ(S)v(S) ≤ v(N). (6)
With the above definitions in mind, we can now prove that each point of the polyhedron (5)
is corresponds to a balanced game. To do this, let S+a = {i ∈ S : d
+
i < K} and S
+
b = {i ∈
S : d+i ≥ K} for all subsets S of N (similarly replace d
+
i with d
−
i to define S
−
a and S
−
b ). Now
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equation (4) can be rewritten as
v(S) ∈ [0, 0] if
∑
i∈S d
+
i < K (7)
v(S) ∈

0, ∑
i∈S+a
d+i +
(
|S+b | − 1
)
K

 if∑
i∈S
d+i ≥ K and
∑
i∈S
d−i < K (8)
v(S) ∈

∑
i∈S−a
d−i +
(
|S−b | − 1
)
K,
∑
i∈S+a
d+i +
(
|S+b | − 1
)
K

 if∑
i∈S
d−i ≥ K. (9)
These expressions are used to prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 The polyhedron (5) describes a family of balanced games.
Proof We prove that condition (6) holds for v(S) as in (7)-(9). Observe that the latter
equations include the generic term ∑
i∈Sa
di + (|Sb| − 1)K.
Also note that condition (6) holds true if the above generic term satisfies
∑
i∈Na
di + (|Nb| − 1)K ≥
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
[∑
i∈Sa
di + (|Sb| − 1)K
]
.
After manipulating the right-hand side, the above condition can be rewritten as∑
i∈Na
di + (|Nb| − 1)K ≥
∑
i∈Na
di
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)eSi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=eN
i
+
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)(|Sb| − 1)K.
Now, observe that the first term in the left-hand side is equal to the first term in the right-
hand. Then it suffices to prove that
(|Nb| − 1)K ≥
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)(|Sb| − 1)K.
But this is easy to see, as the right-hand side can be rewritten as∑
S⊆N
λ(S)(|Sb| − 1)K =
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)
[
eN
T
b eS − 1
]
K
= eN
T
b
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)eSK −
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)K
= eN
T
b eNK −
∑
S⊆N
λ(S)K
=

|Nb| − ∑
S⊆N
λ(S)

K
≤ (|Nb| − 1)K
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where eNb is the characteristic vector of Nb and e
NT
b is its transpose. 
Let us generalize what we have done for the joint replenishment example and introduce a
polyhedral description for addressing families of balanced games. The underlying idea is to
use a polyhedron to describe the infinite set of admissible coalitions’ values. The last part of
this section addresses the notions of the core and an allocation rule. In doing so, we point
out that any allocation rule in the core can be obtained by solving a set of linear equalitions.
Define a family of games < N,V > as the set of games < N, v > obtained when v varies
within a polyhedron
V =
{
v ∈ R2
n−1 : vmin(S) ≤ v(S) ≤ vmax(S), for all S ⊆ N
}
,
where the bounds vmin(S) and vmax(S) are given. For sake of simplicity, throughout this
paper we always assume v ≥ 0. Also, let n = |N |, where |X| is the cardinality of the set X,
and let m = 2n − 1.
Define a family of balanced games < N,Vb > as the set of games < N, v > obtained when
v varies within a polyhedron
Vb = {v ∈ V : condition (6) holds} .
Now, let us revisit the notions of the core and an allocation rule for the above family of
balanced games in polyhedral form. Indicate with ∆n the simplex in Rn and remind that
a game is balanced if and only if the core is nonempty (see, e.g., [10, Theorem 11.7]). By
definition each game < N, v > with v ∈ Vb is balanced, and so the core C(v),
C(v) = {a ∈ Rn :
a
v(N)
∈ ∆n,
∑
i∈S
ai ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N},
is nonempty. This means that there exists an allocation a ∈ C(v) such that no coalition has
an incentive to split off from the coalition N . Now, the idea is to find an allocation rule a(v)
such that for all games v ∈ Vb it holds that a(v) ∈ C(v). To do this, first observe that the core
is a convex set described by linear equations and inequalities. For our purpose it is useful to
change all inequalities into equations. To do this, we first introduce a vector of nonnegative
surplus variables s = (s1, . . . , sm−1)
T . Each surplus variable corresponds to a coalition of
players and describes the difference between the allocated value and the coalitional value,∑
i∈S ai−v(S). Notice that we only needm−1 surplus variables because
∑
i∈N ai = v(N) due
to the efficiency condition of the core. Further, we introduce an incidence matrix B ∈ Rm×n
with the characteristic vectors eS as rows, and an augmented matrix A ∈ Rm×n+(m−1) defined
by
A =

B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−I
−−−−
0 . . . 0

 , (10)
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where I is the (m − 1)-dimensional identity matrix. Finally, define a vector u ∈ Rn+(m−1),
henceforth called allocation vector, by
u =
[
a
s
]
.
Now, for all v ∈ Vb and for any vector a ∈ C(v), there is an allocation vector u ∈ R
n+m−1
that satisfies the following set of linear equations
Au = v, (11)
u ≥ 0. (12)
For instance, if n = 3 condition (11) becomes


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 0 0 0 0 0
0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0


︸ ︷︷ ︸
A


a1
a2
a3
s1
s2
s3
s12
s13
s23


︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
=


v({1})
v({2})
v({3})
v({1, 2})
v({1, 3})
v({2, 3})
v(N)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
v
.
Let U , be the set of solutions satisfying (11)-(12) and observe that, in general, U is a
polyhedron of dimension n − 1. This means that finding an allocation vector in the core
reduces to solving the set of equalities (11)-(12) for u. Notice that two different solutions
of (11) describe different allocations of v(N) among the players, which in turn means a higher
satisfaction for those coalitions with larger surplus variables.
3 Dynamic system.
In this Section we consider a dynamic context where at each time the vector of coalitions’
values fluctuates within a bounded polyhedron. While such fluctuations are unknown, it is
realistic to assume that we know with certainty the average value of each coalition on the
long run. The problem of interest, formulated at the end of this section, consists in finding
“robust” allocation rules that bound a so-called complaint vector and guarantee a certain
average allocation vector.
Consider, the dynamic system
x(k + 1) = x(k) +Au(k)− v(k), v(k) ∈ Vb, k = 1, 2, . . . (13)
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in which the state variable x(k) describes the complaint levels of all subcoalitions at time
k, i.e., the disagreement between the sum of the allocated revenues to the players of the
coalitions, expressed by the product Au(k), and the vector of coalitions’ values v(k). The
condition u(k) ≥ 0 is omitted for sake of notation. More generally, system (13) also holds if
the coalitions’ values change slowly in comparison to the rate at which revenues are allocated.
In that case, it suffices to redefine the vector of coalitions’ values by
v(k) = v(t)Θ, t = bkΘc , v(t) ∈ Vb, k = 1, 2, . . . , (14)
where byc is the greatest integer less than or equal to y and the sample interval Θ with
0 ≤ Θ ≤ 1 describes the length of the time interval between two successive allocations.
Hence, if v(t) is the vector of coalitions’ values in the interval (t− 1, t], then v(k) = v(t)Θ is
the portion of value in the time interval [kΘ, (k + 1)Θ] for k = t−1Θ , . . . ,
t
Θ − 1. A dynamic
system of type (13) suggests the following interpretation (see, e.g., multi-inventory systems in
[1]): x(k) is a vector whose components are the buffer levels (each buffer level describes the
level of complaint of a single coalition), u(k) is the controlled flow vector, A is the controlled
process matrix, and v(k) is an (uncontrolled) exogenous input, typically modelling demand.
Now, given a vector function y : R+ −→ Rm, we define the average of y by
y¯ = lim
T−→∞
1
T
T∑
t=0
y(t).
If we assume that one knows the average value of each coalition, the following lemma
recalls a result obtained in [1].
Lemma 2 (Average constraint) Consider an average vector of coalitions’ values v¯ and a
pre-defined average allocation vector u¯ such that
Au¯ = v¯.
There exists an allocation rule f : Rm −→ Rn+(m−1) such that for u(k) = f(v(k)), with v(k)
as in (14),
Au(k) = v(k)
and whenever the average coalitions’ value tends to v¯, then the average allocation vector tends
to u¯, if and only if there exists a matrix D ∈ Rn+(m−1)×m that satisfies
AD = I ∈ Rm×m (15)
Dv + u¯ ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ Vb. (16)
The allocation rule is linear on v, that is
u(k) = u¯+Dv(k). (17)
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Observe that the linear allocation rule (17) requires perfect knowledge of the coalition
values at each sample time. Differently, consider the case where revenues at time k must
be allocated without a-priori knowledge of the coalitions’ values v(k). We are interested
in finding dynamic allocation rules that keep the complaint vector bounded within a pre-
specified threshold while satisfying the condition that if the average coalitions’s value is v¯
then the average allocation is u¯. For this we need the following definition, see [1]. For
ξ ∈ Rm, let ξi denote the ith component of ξ, and define
|ξ| = max
i
|ξi|.
Let Z denote the set of integers, and Z+ the set of nonnegative integers. Let f = {f(0), f(1), f(2), . . .}
be any bounded one-sided sequence in Rm, and define
‖f(k)‖ = sup
k∈Z+
|f(k)|.
Our dynamic allocation rule is defined as follows.
Definition 3 Given ε > 0 and a reference value x¯ for system (13), an ε-stabilizing
allocation rule is a feedback rule for which there exists a continuous positive function φ(k),
monotonically decreasing and converging to 0 as k −→∞ such that for all x(0), the following
condition holds true
‖x(k) − x¯‖ ≤ max{‖x(0)‖φ(k), ε}.
The problem of interest can be stated as follows.
Problem 1 Given an average vector of coalitions’ values v¯ and a pre-defined average
allocation vector u¯ such that Au¯ = v¯, find an ε-stabilizing allocation rule such that whenever
the average coalitions’ value tends to v¯ then the average allocation vector tends to u¯.
In the next section we present a dynamic allocation rule that solves Problem 1.
4 Dynamic Allocation Rule.
The dynamic allocation rule that we propose as a solution to Problem 1 allocates the rev-
enues according to the values assumed by an opportunely designed augmented state variable.
Such a state variable models the complaint level of each coalition combined with the devia-
tion of the instantaneous allocation from the pre-defined average allocation of each coalition.
With the given augmented state variable Problem 1 reduces to simply finding an ε-stabilizing
allocation rule for the augmented dynamic system. Actually, as it will be clearer later on, ε-
stabilizing the augmented system implies both ε-stabilizing the complaint vector and meeting
the average constraints.
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From a standard property of linear algebra, see also the appendix, we can find two matrices
C and F which “square” A and D and satisfy[
A
C
] [
D F
]
= I. (18)
Consider the following augmented system
x(k + 1) = x(k) +Au(k)− v(k),
y(k + 1) = y(k) + Cu(k),
(19)
where v(k) is as in (14). The additional dynamic variable y(k) keeps track of the deviation
between the instantaneous and the average allocation of each player. Define the augmented
state variable z ∈ Rn+m−1 as
z(k) =
[
D F
] [ x(k)
y(k)
]
,
[
x(k)
y(k)
]
=
[
A
C
]
z(k).
This variable satisfies the equation
z(k + 1) =
[
D F
] [ x(k + 1)
y(k + 1)
]
=
[
D F
] [ x(k)
y(k)
]
+
[
D F
] [ A
C
]
u(k)−
[
D F
] [ v(k)
0
]
= z(k) + u(k)−Dv(k). (20)
This indicates that the allocation rule u(k) = −z(k), which is linear in z, solves the problem.
Theorem 1 Consider system (20) with v(k) as in (14). The allocation rule in feedback
form
u(k) = −z(k) (21)
is such that the following condition on z holds true
‖z(k)‖ ≤ ‖Dv(k)‖ (22)
and if the average coalitions’ value is v¯ then the average allocation vector is u¯.
Proof To prove (22) let us substitute the allocation rule (21) in the dynamics of (20). Then,
we obtain z((k + 1)) = Dv(k) for all k, which implies (22). For the rest of the proof, by
summing (20) for different k = 1, 2, . . ., we have that
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
u(k)−
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
Dv(k) =
z(T )− z(0)
T
→ 0
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as T → ∞ (actually the numerator is a finite quantity whereas the denominator tends to
infinity). Therefore u¯ = Dv¯, which concludes the proof. 
For fixed ε we wish to find the maximum time interval Θ∗ such that ‖Dv(k)‖ ≤ ε. Trivially,
such a value is Θ∗ = ε
δ
where δ = maxv∈Vb |Dv|. Then we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Consider system (20) with v(k) as in (14). For any ε and corresponding
Θ∗, if one chooses Θ ≤ min{Θ∗, 1}, then the allocation rule in feedback form
u(k) = −z(k), (23)
is ε-stabilizing.
Proof It is easy to show that
‖z(k)‖ ≤ ‖Dv(t)Θ‖ ≤ ‖Dv(t)Θ∗‖ ≤ max
v∈Vb
|DvΘ∗| ≤ ε.

Remark 1 A side effect of ‖z‖ ≤ ε is that also ‖u‖ ≤ ε as u = −z. This means that the
smaller ε the smaller the maximum allocation (in magnitude).
5 Numerical example.
We return to the example in Section 2. In short, there is a set of retailers N = {1, 2, 3},
a transportation cost K = 7, minimum and maximum demands for each retailer d1 ∈ [0, 5],
d2 ∈ [0, 10] and d3 ∈ [3, 8]. The family of cost games is
c({1}) ∈ [0, 5] c({2}) ∈ [0, 7] c({3}) ∈ [3, 7]
c({1, 2}) ∈ [0, 7] c({1, 3}) ∈ [3, 7] c({2, 3}) ∈ [3, 7] c(N) ∈ [3, 7],
and the associated family of cost-saving games is defined by
v({1}) = 0 v({2}) = 0 v({3}) = 0
v({1, 2}) ∈ [0, 5] v({1, 3}) ∈ [0, 5] v({2, 3}) ∈ [0, 7] v(N) ∈ [0, 12].
Let the average vector of coalitions’ values be
v¯ = [0, 0, 0, 2, 3, 4, 10]T
and the pre-defined average allocation vector
u¯ = [3, 5, 2, 3, 5, 2, 6, 2, 3]T .
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Note that Au¯ = v¯. As for the threshold for the complaint vector we choose ε = 0.5
First we calculate D (details on how to formulate a linear programming problem to find
D are in [1]) and obtain
D =


0.22222 −0.11111 −0.11111 0.11111 0.11111 −0.22222 0.33333
−0.11111 0.22222 −0.11111 0.13695 −0.18346 0.16279 0.46253
−0.11111 −0.11111 0.22222 −0.24806 0.072351 0.059432 0.20413
−0.77778 −0.11111 −0.11111 0.11111 0.11111 −0.22222 0.33333
−0.11111 −0.77778 −0.11111 0.13695 −0.18346 0.16279 0.46253
−0.11111 −0.11111 −0.77778 −0.24806 0.072351 0.059432 0.20413
0.11111 0.11111 −0.22222 −0.75194 −0.072351 −0.059432 0.79587
0.11111 −0.22222 0.11111 −0.13695 −0.81654 −0.16279 0.53747
−0.22222 0.11111 0.11111 −0.11111 −0.11111 −0.77778 0.66667


.
Then we compute the matrices C and F that square B and D using the method explained
in detail in appendix A. For the maximum sample time we get Θ∗ > 0.1 and choose Θ = 0.1.
It is left to implement the dynamic allocation rule (23) in feedback form to simulate the
evolution of the augmented state variable z(.). Fig. 2 displays all nine components of vector
z(.) (remind z and u have the same dimension). From the plot we can see that each component
zi(.) always lies in between −0.5 and 0.5.
6 The Shapley value as linear allocation rule.
In this Section we study the Shapley value as a special linear allocation rule of the
form (17). In particular, we show that there is a matrix Φ that satisfies (15).
The Shapley value φ, which is defined in [7], equals φ = 1
n!
∑
σ∈Π(N)m
σ where Π(N) is the
set of all permutations of N and mσ is the marginal vector corresponding to the permutation
σ.
Theorem 2 The Shapley value φ is linear on v, i.e.,
φ = Lv, (24)
where the matrix L ∈ Rn×m is defined by
Lij =
1
n!
·
{
−s!(n− (s+ 1))! if i 6∈ S
(s − 1)!(n − s)! if i ∈ S.
(25)
if column j corresponds to coalition S with s = |S|.
Proof The proof follows immediately from the definition of the Shapley value in [7]. 
13
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
k
z(k
Θ
)
Figure 2: Time plot of the augmented state variable z(.). Variable z(.) is always comprised
between −0.5 and 0.5.
14
For instance, if n = 3 we have
L =
1
6

 2 −1 −1 1 1 −2 2−1 2 −1 1 −2 1 2
−1 −1 2 −2 1 1 2

 . (26)
Let s(φ) be the vector of surplus variables when revenues are allocated according to the
Shapley value φ. The idea is now to express s(φ) linearly in v.
Theorem 3 The vector of surplus variables is linear on v, i.e.,
s(φ) = Qv, (27)
where Q ∈ Rm−1×m has row i associated to a surplus variable (a subcoalition S ⊂ N), column
j associated to a subcoalition M ⊆ N , and generic ijth element
Qij =
{ ∑
p∈S Lpj if i 6= j∑
p∈S Lpj − 1 if i = j.
(28)
Proof First, consider the coalition of only player 1 and let Li• be the generic ith row of L.
The associated surplus variable is
s1(φ) = φ1 − v({1}) = L1•v − v({1}) = (L11 − 1)v({1}) + L12v({2}) + . . .+ L1mv(N).
The latter equation yields Q1• = [(L11 − 1) L12 . . . L1m] , which is in according with (28).
If we repeat the same reasoning for a generic subcoalition M ⊂ N , the surplus variable is
sM(φ) =
∑
i∈M
φi − v(M) =
∑
i∈M
Li•v − v(M).
Remind j is the column associated to coalition M . Then, the latter equation yields Qjk =∑
i∈M Lik if k 6= j and Qjj =
∑
i∈M Lij − 1 which is in accordance with (28). 
An example of matrix Q for the case n = 3, is the following one (see, e.g., matrix L in
(26) for the case n = 3)
Q =
1
6


−4 −1 −1 1 1 −2 2
−1 −4 −1 1 −2 1 2
−1 −1 −4 −2 1 1 2
−1 −1 −2 −4 −1 −1 4
−1 −2 −1 −1 −4 −1 4
−2 −1 −1 −1 −1 −4 4


. (29)
Using the fact that φ and s(φ) are linear functions of v, we define the allocation vector
associated to the Shapley value by
u(φ) =
[
φ
s(φ)
]
.
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Corollary 2 There exists a matrix Φ ∈ Rn+m−1×m, defined by Φ =
[
L
Q
]
such that
u(φ) = Φv.
Furthermore Φ is a pseudo inverse of A, i.e.,
AΦ = I. (30)
Proof For the first part, from Theorem 2 and 3 we have[
φ
s(φ)
]
=
[
L
Q
]
v
which finishes this part.
Let us now prove that AΦ = I. It suffices to show that Ai•Φ•j = 1 if i = j and zero
otherwise. By observing that the generic row i of A, denoted by Ai• ∈ R
1×n+(m−1), is
associated to a generic subcoalition M ⊆ N , whereas the generic column j of Φ, denoted
Φ•j ∈ R
n+(m−1)×1, is associated to a generic subcoalition S ⊆ N , the condition i = j
corresponds to M = S.
Returning to Ai•, it has the first n elements associated to players p = 1 . . . n, and the last
m− 1 elements associated to all subcoalitions R ⊂ N (recall the structure of A described in
(10)). Using index p to scan all players and R to scan all subcoalitions, we can sketch its
structure as follows
Ai• = [. . . 1︸︷︷︸
∀p∈M
. . . . . . 0︸︷︷︸
∀p 6∈M
. . . . . . −1︸︷︷︸
R=M
. . . . . . 0︸︷︷︸
∀R6=M
. . .]. (31)
Analogously, Φ•j has the first n elements associated to players p = 1 . . . n, and the last
m− 1 elements associated to all subcoalitions R ⊂ N (remind the structure of Q and L from
(25) and (28)).
Now, keeping in mind the structures of Ai• in (31), if i = j, namely, M = S we have
Ai•Φ•j =
∑
p∈S
Lpj − (
∑
p∈S
Lpj − 1) = 1.
On the contrary if i 6= j, namely, M 6= S, we have
Ai•Φ•j =
1
n!
[
∑
p∈M
Lpj −
∑
p∈M
Lpj] = 0.

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If n = 3, putting together (26) and (29), we have
Φ =
1
6


2 −1 −1 1 1 −2 2
−1 2 −1 1 −2 1 2
−1 −1 2 −2 1 1 2
−− −− −− −− −− −− −−
−4 −1 −1 1 1 −2 2
−1 −4 −1 1 −2 1 2
−1 −1 −4 −2 1 1 2
−1 −1 −2 −4 −1 −1 4
−1 −2 −1 −1 −4 −1 4
−2 −1 −1 −1 −1 −4 4


.
7 Conclusions.
Inspired by a joint replenishment application, we have considered a dynamic cooperative
game where while we know with certainty the average value of each coalition on the long
run, at each time such a value is unknown and fluctuates within a bounded polyhedron. In
this context, we have presented a constructive method to find “robust” allocation rules, i.e.,
allocation rules that bound, within a pre-defined threshold, a so-called complaint vector while
guaranteeing a certain average allocation vector.
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A Computation of C and F .
We briefly show how to compute C and F given A and D. To simplify notation let
n+m− 1 = r. With this aim, note that the following conditions must hold:
AD = I (32)
AF = 0 (33)
CD = 0 (34)
CF = I. (35)
Let us now rewrite the matrices A,C,D and F as follows.
• A = [ A0 A1 ] where A0 is a m× r−m matrix and A1 is an m×m non singular matrix.
• C = [ C0 C1 ] where C0 is a r −m× r −m matrix and C1 is an r −m×m matrix.
• D =
[
D0
D1
]
where D0 is an r−m×m matrix and D1 is an m×m non singular matrix.
• F =
[
F0
F1
]
where F0 is a r −m× r −m matrix and F1 is an m× r −m matrix.
Now, we derive the following relationships among the different components of the above
matrices:
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• from (33), we obtain A1F1 = −A0F0. Whence F1 = −A
−1
1 A0F0;
• from (34), we obtain D1C1 = −C0D0. Whence C1 = −C0D0D
−1
1 ;
• from (35), we obtain C0F0 = I − C1F1 = I +C0D0D
−1
1 F1 = I − C0D0D
−1
1 A
−1
1 A0F0.
Imposing, e.g., C0 = I we have F0 = (I +D0D
−1
1 A
−1
1 A0)
−1. Consequently,
C = [ I | −D0D
−1
1 ]
F =
[
(I +D0D
−1
1 A
−1
1 A0)
−1
−A−11 A0(I +D0D
−1
1 A
−1
1 A0)
−1
]
.
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